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rejected by the denial of more extensive intervention in Campbell
Soup.A5 Apart from the FTC, whether public-interest intervention will
have any significant impact on administrative agencies is difficult to
forecast. Cases such as Church of Christ, in which the petitioners
attempted unsuccessfully for more than ten years to have a television
station's license revoked, illustrate the hurdles. The agencies have
exhibited irritation and hostility toward efforts which have the effect
of enlarging their constituencies. To the extent that there is such
hostility it can result in the exercise of administrative discretion in a
manner unfavorable to the intervenor and cause delay when the
intervenor appeals such decisions.6 Absent such hostility there will
still be a great deal of litigation generated by public-interest
intervenors who take a position adverse to that of the private party
involved, as in Firestone. In addition to clogging the dockets, such
delay may in some cases mitigate the effects of any just conclusion
that is reached.6 7 Moreover, to sustain such prolonged litigation, a
public-interest intervenor must be well-organized and well-financed.
Not-withstanding these difficulties, so long as public-interest
intervenors can continue to participate in agency proceedings, even if
in only a limited number of cases, it seems inescapable that such
participation will ultimately result in more careful administrative
action. The Firestone decision is an example of precisely this effect.
VI. HEARINGS
Administrative Discovery
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in NLRB v.
to individual intervenors who do not have adequate financial backing. The FCC granted the
request of a student group that it be permitted to file only the original and one copy of its
petition. Interview with Mr. Bass, Broadcasting Rules and Standards, FCC, July 9, 1970,
concerning the oralpermission in Petition for Rule Making of TUBE (Termination of Unfaii
Broadcasting Practices) for Adoption of Standards Designed to Eliminate Deceptive
Advertising From Television, RM 1553, filed Jan. 13, 1970. The FTC granted two requests
concerning transcripts in 1970. Student participants in Campbell Soup Co. were granted a free
transcript and permission to file single copies of documents. 26 AD. L.2D at 1016. Second, a
Washington consurher-protection group was permitted to buy a transcript of proceedings at the
lesser FTC photocopying rate-30 cents per page instead of 50 cents. Letter from Joseph W.
Shea, Secretary, FTC, to Benny Kass, February 25, 1970.
65. See separate statement of Commissioner Elman, 26 AD. L.2D at 1016.
66. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
67. See separate statement of Commissioner Maclntyre, 427 AD. L.2D at 880.
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Interboro Contractors, Inc.,' that parties in a proceeding before the
Board are not entitled to pre-hearing discovery procedures as
provided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 An unfair labor
practice charge had been filed against Interboro alleging that two
employees engaging in protected activity had been discharged in
violation of section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act.3
Finding the allegations to be true and an unfair labor practice to have
occurred, the Board obtained an enforcement order from the Second
Circuit directing that the employees be compensated for any loss of
pay accruing as a result of the violation.4 In furtherance of this order
and in accordance with the Board's rules and regulations, a hearing
was ordered to determine the amount due. Although Interboro did not
use the subpoenas duces tecum and a subpoena ad testificandum
which it acquired in preparation for the hearing, it repeatedly applied
for permission to take depositions from the discharged employees.
The first of these requests was denied for failure to show "good
cause" as required by section 102.30 of the Board's rules.5 The
subsequent requests were interpreted as motions for pre-hearing
discovery and as such not authorized by section 102.30, which,
according to the Board, permitted depositions to be taken only as a
substitute for testimony of witnesses unavailable to appear at a
hearing.' Interboro moved for an adjournment at the close of cross-
examination claiming that they were not prepared to meet the issues
raised by the Board's exhibits or by unforeseen testimony of the
Board's witnesses since they had not been permitted to utilize
discovery. The motion was denied and the hearing was terminated
without presentation of the company's case. Thereafter the trial
examiner's award of back pay was affirmed by the Board7 over the
company's objection, and enforcement of the order was subsequently
granted by the Second Circuit.
In 1938, with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, pre-trial discovery became firmly entrenched in federal
1. 432 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Feb. 16,
1971).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
3. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1964).
4. NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1967).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1970). See text accompanying note 26 infra.
6. See note 24 infra and accompanying text.
7. 432 F.2d at 857.
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litigation, and most state courts soon adopted similar rules.'
However, the utilization of such discovery has generally been rejected
in administrative adjudications; even those agencies whose hearings
closely resemble judicial proceedings have not extensively employed
it.' The hesitancy of agencies to provide discovery procedures has been
encouraged by judicial determinations that parties to judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings are not entitled to pre-trial discovery as a
matter of constitutional right"0 and by the absence of any specific
requirement for discovery in the Administrative Procedure Act."
Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, in
the absence of specific- congressional approval, federal agencies may
not fashion their own discovery rules under their general rule-making
power. 12 However, notwithstanding the apparent reluctance of
agencies and courts to promulgate discovery procedures, certain
inroads have recently appeared which indicate a trend toward
discovery before administrative bodies. In FMC v. Anglo-A merican
Shipping Co.'3 the Ninth Circuit commented that "at least three
federal agencies . . . appear to have been vested with express
statutory authority to authorize pre-hearing interparty discovery
involving the production of documents."' 14 Of even more direct
significance are the rules of the Federal Communications
Commission, which give parties a general right to pre-hearing
discovery, 5 specifically providing broad discovery rights subject to
control by the hearing examiner. 6 Nevertheless, some hesitancy on
the part of agencies to permit discovery remains, as is clearly
demonstrated by the policies of the NLRB.
The NLRB has steadfastly maintained that its rules and
regulations do not provide for pre-hearing discovery by parties
8. Kintner, Discovery in Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings, 16 AD. L. REV. 233
(1964).
9. Id.
10. E.g., Starr v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 721, 722 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
993 (1956); NLRB v. Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951).
11. Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 28 (1959).
12. Fairbank v. Hardin, ..._F.2d _, (9th Cir. 1970); FMC v. Anglo-American Shipping
Co., 335 F.2d 255, 261 (9th Cir. 1964).
13. 335 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1964).
14. Id. at 261 & n.9. (Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, and
Federal Power Commission).
15. 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.311-.325 (1970).
16. C.F.R. §§ 3.21-.33 (1970).
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brought before the Board, 17 irrespective of the Board's own right to
engage in discovery.' Informal attempts to engage in discovery may
even be an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1) of the National
Labor Relations Act.' 9 Although it is generally agreed that the Board
has authority to promulgate a discovery rule if it so desires, 2 the
rationale against such a procedure is that discovery might result in the
intimidation of employees 2' and complicate the administrative process
by promoting delay and increasing costs. Such policy has thus far
withstood due process attacks2 as well as attempts to justify discovery
under the Administrative Procedure Act.24 The principal pro-
discovery arguments, however, have relied on either section 10(b) of
the National Labor Relations Act2 or section 102.30 of the NLRB's
rules. 26 The former provides that Board proceedings "shall, so far as
practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence
applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rule of
civil procedure for the district courts of the United States. . . 2
while the latter specifies that:
[W]itnesses shall be examined orally under oath, except that for good cause
shown after the issuance of a complaint, testimony may be taken bj,
deposition....
17. E.g., Electromec Design v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); Plumbers &
Steamfitters Union Local 100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400, enforced, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961);
Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960); Del. E. Webb Constr.
Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 377, n.2 (1951), petition for enforcement denied on other grounds, 196 F.2d
702 (8th Cir. 1952). See generally NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402,407 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961) (dicta).
18. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 11(1), 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1964).
19. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B. 848 (1963), enforced, 341 F.2d 750 (6th
Cir. 1965).
20. E.g., Electromec Design v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Vapor
Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1961).
21. Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Board and Discovery Procedures, 18
AD. L. REv. 9, 15 (1966); Labor Law-Pre-Hearing Discovery of Employee's Statements, 48
N.C.L. REv. 368, 378-80 (1970).
22. See Melnick, Little, & Tripp, Discovery Prior to Administrative Adjudications-A
Statutory Proposal, 17 AD. L. Rav. 262 (1965); 52 CAUF. L. RaV. 823 (1964).
23. Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960); NLRB v. Globe
Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951). The petitioners in Interboro are attempting to
employ such an argument before the Supreme Court. Petitioner Brief for Certiorari at 9,
Interboro Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1964). See, e.g., Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp.
591 (D. P.R. 1967).
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v.
Globe Wireless, Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951); Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 95 N.L.R.B.
377 n.2 (1951).
26. See, e.g., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960).
27. 29 U.S.C. §- 160(b) (1964).
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. . .(a) The regional director or trial examiner, as the case may be, shall
upon receipt of the application, if in his discretion good cause has been shown,
make and serve upon the parties an order which will specify the name of the
witness whose deposition is to be taken and the time, the place, and the
designation of the officer before whom the witness is to testify. . ..
One court has also found section 102.35 pertinent; that section states
that the trial examiner has the power to "take or cause depositions to
be taken whenever the ends of justice would be served thereby."''2
Reliance on section 10(b) of the NLRA has failed because it has been
interpreted to apply only to rules of evidence, under the rules of civil
procedure used in the federal system.3 0 In justification of this
interpretation the courts have relied not only on the language of
section 10(b) but on the legislative history surrounding it. Typical of
the congressional discussion which accompanied the present version
of section 10(b) was the comment that
[section 10(b)] also changes the procedure as to the introduction of evidence
before the Board. It must now be conducted according to the rules of evidence
applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules adopted by
the Supreme Court. . .and the Board cannot exclude the rules of evidence as
was heretofore done. 1
The arguments relying on the apparently broad discretion given trial
examiners and regional directors by the Board's rules have also failed
because the Board and most courts have determined that the rules
only provide for the taking of depositions for use as evidence when the
witness will be unavailable at the hearing.32 Notwithstanding the
weight of authority, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held-in decisions strongly refuted in Interboro-that discovery is
provided for under the Board rules and by section 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act.Y
28. 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1970) (emphasis added).
29. NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 955 (1968); 29 C.F.R. § 102.35 (1970).
30. See cases cited note 23 supra.
31. 93 CONG. REc. 3529 (1947) (remarks of Representative Owens).
32. Cf., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1960). But see
NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965) (dictum) (NLRB, acting in
a quasi-judicial capacity as it does, should freely permit discovery procedure in order that rights
of all parties may be properly protected); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407
(7th Cir. 1961) (dictum) (administration of Board rules might be an abuse of discretion,
providing a party made a sufficient showing of need for discovery).
33. NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Safway Steel Scaffolds Co., 383 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967).
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In Interboro the Second Circuit continued to uphold the Board's
contention that rule 102.30 authorizes the taking of depositions only if
the witness whose deposition is sought may be unavailable at the
hearing and does not authorize general pre-hearing discovery. The
court explained that rule 102.30 had evolved without substantial
change from the original rule promulgated in 1935 which in form had
been patterned after Equity Rule 47. The latter rule permitted
depositions to be taken "upon good and exceptional cause" for the
purpose of obtaining and preserving evidence for trial but not for the
purpose of discovery.3 Furthermore, the court held that the NLRA
does not require the Board to adopt discovery procedures although the
Board may promulgate such under its general rule-making power.
The court denied that Congress had ever intended for the
Administrative Procedure Act to provide for pre-trial discovery,
supporting this position by stating that "our research discloses no
federal agency which gives litigants the right to pre-hearing discovery
in proceedings before it." The Fifth Circuit's position that section
10(b) and Board rules provide for discovery was rejected for the
reason that in both instances the Fifth Circuit had completely ignored
or misinterpreted their respective legislative histories. Recognizing,
however, that its sister court's interpretation of the rules on their face
was at least arguably meritorious, the Second Circuit concluded that,
even if discovery were provided for under the rules, the trial
examiner's denial of discovery would be sustained for failure to show
procedural error due to abuse of discretion.8 After having disposed of
any claims of prejudice arising directly from the denial of discovery,
since no showing had been made that unforeseen evidence crucial to
the company's case was introduced at the hearing, the court upheld
the trial examiner's refusal to grant a continuance and ordered
enforcement of the back pay order.
There is little question that section 10(b) of the NLRA does not
literally afford discovery,37 and it has thus far been futile to attempt to
convince the Board that their rules mean other than what they say
they mean.3s Given these premises as well as supporting legislative
history the Second Circuit was correct in denying the claim that pre-
34. See generally Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45 W. VA. L.Q. 5, 19 (1938).
35. 432 F.2d at 858-59.
36. See notes 28-29 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Walsh-Lumpkin Wholesale Drug Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 294,296 (1960).
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hearing discovery before the Board is specifically authorized. But
whether the Board's basic policy of refusing to authorize discovery is
sound and equitable remains unanswered. Those against discovery
argue that such procedure would make NLRB hearings more costly
and time consuming3' and promote harrassment and intimidation of
employees." In rebuttal it is suggested that discovery minimizes
gamesmanship and surprise, helps identify and simplify the issues,"
and could thereby expedite adjudications.42 Many authorities feel that
there is no valid reason to suppose that such a result would not also
accrue if discovery were permitted by the Board.43
Denying discovery because of possible employee intimidation is
unreasonable in a number of respects. First, subsequent to an
employee testifying at the hearing, any pre-hearing statements made
by him to a Board representative must be made available to company
attorneys for use in cross examination. 4 This requirement at the least
partially negates the protective secrecy with which the Board attempts
to surround its witnesses and arguably questions the entire validity of
the Board's position. Second, protection from both pre- and post-
hearing intimidation is independently provided by the LMRA which
makes-it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge or
otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under the Act. Third, use of discovery
procedures for harrassment or intimidation purposes would be most
difficult since a Board representative could certainly be present at the
taking of the deposition. Finally, future intimidation would be most
unlikely since any wrongful actions taken toward the employee
concerned would be extremely suspect and highly vulnerable to an
unfair labor practice charge. In view of the success of discovery in our
courts and in light of the inherent unfairness to litigants resulting
39. Melnick, Little, & Tripp, supra note 22, at 281.
40. Manoli & Joseph, supra note 21, at 15; 48 N.C.L. Rav., supra note 21.
41. Berger, supra note 11, at 28.
42. Melnick, Little, & Tripp, supra note 22, at 262-63.
43. Berger, supra note 11, at 29; Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings: Why
Agencies Should Catch Up With the Courts, 46 A.B.A.J. 74 (1960); Cox, Adherence to the
Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Means of Expediting Proceedings,
12 AD. L. BULL. 51, 55 (1959); Gallagher, Use of Pre-Trial as a Means of Overcoming Undue
and Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings, 12 AD. L. BULL. 44,47 (1959); Melnick,
Little, & Tripp, supra note 22, at 262-63.
44. 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(b)(1) (1970).
45. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)
(1964).
[Vol. 1971:149
ADMINISTRA TIVE LA W-1970
from the "one-way street" discovery currently practiced by the
Board, the remaining possibility of intimidation based upon
discovered information should not deter the adoption of at least a
modified form of discovery. Indeed, contrary to the Second Circuit's
conclusion in Interboro, the Board's current policy in this respect is
not a "logical one." Furthermore, contrary to that court's denial of
knowledge of federal agencies which provide for discovery, a number
of agencies now permit such a procedure.46 Since there is substantial
agreement that the Board has the authority to institute a discovery
rule and neither Congress nor the courts appears disposed to impose
discovery on the Board, it can only be hoped that the Board will
follow the lead of the agencies permitting such a procedure. If and
when a discovery rule is drafted, the drafters should not be confronted
with a choice between administrative efficiency and fundamenal
fairness. Instead, they must achieve the attainable integration of the
former with the latter 47 while insuring that the rights of all parties are
properly protected. 8
VII. DECISIONS AND SANCTIONS
ICC Continuing Jurisdiction
The Interstate Commerce Commission has been given broad
statutory authority to rehear previously decided cases' and "reverse,
change, or modify" its earlier orders.2 Moreover, the Commission has
asserted that through its inherent power as an administrative agency it
may on its own motion reconsider any matter on a theory of
continuing jurisdiction. 3 However, once the Commission has issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity, certain statutory
46. See notes 14-16, supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Administrative
Conference recommendation on discovery, see Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication,
1971 DuKE L.J. 89.
47. Symposium, The Role of Discovery in Federal Trade Commission Proceedings, 21 AD.
L. REV. 439, 442 (1969).
48. See NLRB v. Southern Materials Co., 345 F.2d 240, 244 (4th Cir. 1965).
1. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 17(6) (1964) (parties may petition for rehearing at
any time).
2. Id. § 17(7).
3. See Eazor Express, Inc.-Purchase-Fleet Highway Freight Lines, Inc., 101 M.C.C. 719,
720 (1967).
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